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Just like you like it - The effects of transparency and
decision outcome on the evaluation of human and
algorithmic decision-making
Jessica Ochmann
Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, School of Business and Economics, Institute
of Information Systems, Nürnberg, Germany
jessica.ochmann@fau.de

Abstract. Algorithms are increasingly offered for human decision-making processes to support individuals with sophisticated data-driven insights in a variety
of decision domains. Despite this promising potential, prior findings on the perceptions of algorithmic decision-making are ambiguous. This has led to a vivid
discussion regarding the comprehensibility and fairness perceptions associated
with human and algorithmic decision agents that also emphasized the role that
decision-related factors can play in determining the evaluation of a certain decision.
In a preregistered online experiment with 400 participants, we find that differences
in the perceptions of decision transparency and fairness can be rather ascribed to
the processes and rules applied to arrive at the decision and the decision outcome’s
sentiment than to the decision agent. However, being confronted with a negative
decision outcome in a situation that is characterized by uncertainty, leads to a
preference for human decision agents.
Keywords: Algorithms, decision-making, transparency, fairness perceptions.

1

Introduction

When making decisions, individuals are increasingly confronted with algorithms aiming
to support their reasoning processes and guide them towards the ‘right’ choice. These
algorithms are capable of analyzing large data sets autonomously and enable their users
to recognize patterns and derive novel insights for a variety of tasks. Consumers, for
example, can rely on algorithms to find a partner, receive product recommendations, and
manage their finances [1]. Next to these applications in the end-user domain, organizations have also recognized the great potential of algorithm supported decision-making
and included sophisticated forecasting models in their internal processes, such as hiring,
promotion, and credit decisions [2, 3].
In light of their predictive power and ability to even outperform human decisionmakers [4, 5], algorithms are often readily accepted by individuals to support them in
both their professional and private lives, especially for numeric tasks with objectively
correct answers [6]. However, there are some decision domains in which people are
reluctant to use and rely on algorithmic decision agents. When it comes to medical
decisions, for example, individuals hesitate to use algorithms [7] and expect medical
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staff to rely on their own judgments instead of consulting an algorithm [8]. In addition,
other empirical evidence suggests that people prefer human recommendations over those
given by algorithms [6], with regard to investment recommendations [3] or the ability to
predict which joke a person prefers [5]. These ambiguous results indicate that the use
of algorithms in human decision-making is not only complex from a technical, but also
from a behavioral and sociotechnical perspective. Up until now, no scientific consensus
has been reached regarding the general attitude of humans towards algorithm-supported
decision-making – exemplarily reflected by the two seemingly contradicting research
streams of algorithm aversion [6, 9] and algorithm appreciation [10].
In the present study, I aim to contribute to prior research on attitudes and perceptions
associated with algorithm-supported decision-making. More precisely, I am interested in
evaluating whether the simple fact that either a human or an algorithm made a decision
leads to different perceptions among individuals or if other decision-related factors
determine the evaluation of human and algorithmic decision processes. In line with prior
literature, I propose such additional factors, namely the processes and rules applied to
arrive at the decision and the decision outcome’s sentiment [11]. Thus, making sense of
a decision’s outcome might be - next to the general perception of the decision agent - a
key determinant for its evaluation. This assumption aligns with prior research showing
that individuals might be suspicious of algorithmic decision agents as they are not
able to relate to their underlying processes and believe that human decision outcomes
are easier to understand [5]. Based on this reasoning, I propose that increasing the
comprehensibility and transparency of algorithmic decision-making processes might
enable individuals to better understand the respective decision outcomes. Indeed, aligning
the amount of information provided for algorithmic decision-making processes with the
amount of information individuals would expect from a human could lead to similar
decision transparency of human and algorithmic decision agents. To verify the proposed
approach, I aim to answer the following research question:
RQ1 : How do individuals’ decision transparency perceptions of human and algorithmic
decision agents differ when receiving additional information on the decision
outcome’s underlying processes?
Recently, a vivid debate has emerged among scientists that research on algorithmsupported decision-making requires the consideration of fairness aspects as the use of
algorithms in decision-making might cause unintended consequences, such as showing
discriminatory tendencies [12–15]. To comply with guidelines for research ethics, the
evaluation of decision transparency regarding human and algorithmic decision agents,
thus, cannot be made without discussing the implications for the individual’s subjective
fairness perceptions. While prior research on algorithmic fairness has predominantly
focused on the technical perspective to develop unbiased algorithms [12, 16], research on
subjective fairness perceptions is still scarce and characterized by inconclusive findings
regarding the preference for human and algorithmic decision agents [13]. Therefore, I
aim to answer the call for a thorough empirical understanding of individual’s fairness
perceptions. To do so, I investigate one possibility to increase fairness perceptions of
algorithm-supported decision-making: transparently communicating the decision process.
Prior research has shown that perceptions of unfairness often result from the feeling that

individuals are not able to understand how algorithmic decision agents evolve a certain
decision [5, 17]. Indeed, transparent decisions should lead to similar evaluations of the
decision in regards to fairness perceptions - regardless of whether the decision was made
by a human or an algorithm. In addition, the results of prior scholarly work have shown
that a decision’s outcome affects its associated fairness perceptions, whereby positive
outcomes are more likely to receive higher fairness ratings than negative outcomes [18].
Therefore, I aim to answer the following research question:
RQ2 : How do individuals’ fairness perceptions of human and algorithmic decision
agents differ when receiving additional information on the decision outcome’s
underlying processes and being confronted with a positive decision outcome?
To shed light on these research questions and to test the corresponding hypotheses,
I conducted a preregistered survey-based online experiment with 400 participants. All
participants read about either a positive or a negative credit decision that a financial
institute makes. Depending on the experimental condition, participants further received
additional information on the decision-making process. In addition, participants learned
that the financial institute can either have an employee or have an algorithm decide
whether a customer qualifies for a loan and expressed, in random order, their transparency
and fairness perceptions of the respective decision-maker. This work, thereby, contributes
to ongoing IS research by empirically investigating how individuals react to human
and algorithmic decision agents in differing decision conditions. Thus, the suggested
perspective extends prior research by investigating if decision-related factors can help to
explain decision transparency and fairness perceptions.
This article proceeds as follows: First, I present related work on the interaction
between human and algorithms and discuss the implications for fairness perceptions
along with the hypotheses. This section is followed by a description of the experimental
design and results. The article closes with a discussion of the findings and the resulting
scholarly and practical implications.

2
2.1

Theoretical background and hypotheses development
Research on human-algorithm interaction

Integrating algorithmic support in human decision-making processes has the great potential to increase decision quality and ease the cognitive burden on individuals. For this
reason, scholars have developed a great interest in the theoretical mechanisms underlying
human decision-maker’s acceptance of algorithms in various domains (e.g., finance,
health, human resources) [10]. Recent evidence in this research stream suggests that
individuals often prefer human over algorithmic advice – despite algorithms outperforming human reasoning in multiple forecasting tasks. This phenomenon has been coined
algorithm aversion in prior work [4]. Önkal et al. [19], for example, have shown that
individuals are more likely to adjust stock price forecasts when they stem from statistical
forecasting methods compared to human reasoning. Dietvorst et al. [9] found a similiar
tendency showing that individuals who see an algorithm err subsequently prefer human
over algorithmic forecasts – even when being aware that humans also make mistakes.

This general aversion towards algorithms can result from algorithmic opacity [20–22],
loss of control [15, 23, 24], human’s overconfidence of their own decision-making
[4], ethical concerns [25], and perceived lack of algorithm capabilities and ability to
empathize [7, 26]. The exact mechanisms leading to algorithm aversion, however, are yet
not fully understood [6]. While a considerable amount of empirical research has found
evidence for the existence of algorithm aversion and identified approaches to overcome
it, such as considering human decision-makers in the forecasting process and enable
them to adjust the forecast [27] or modifying the algorithm [4], recent studies showed
the opposite effect of algorithm appreciation for numeric tasks [6], social close human
agents [10], and financial advice [28].
Summarizing, research on both, algorithm aversion and algorithm appreciation,
compares the reactions towards human and algorithmic decision-makers. However, this
research stream has particularly focused on the human decision maker that has to rely
on algorithms in decision making processes [10]. While this work is relevant for the
design of sustainable human-AI-interactions, it offers limited insights for individual’s
reactions towards algorithmic decision-making when they are exposed to algorithmic
decision agents and do not use the technology actively [26]. Indeed, being an active user
of algorithms and being exposed to an algorithm’s outcome might result in a different
set of behavioral patterns. For this reason, I concentrate on the evaluation of human and
algorithm decision-making in situations were the rating individual is not the decisionmaker, but potentially affected by the decision. In addition, I aim to examine if the
different perceptions of human and algorithm decision-makers in prior literature are
grounded in the nature of the decision-maker itself or in other variables, such as the
decision-making process and the decision outcome.
Prior research suggests, for example, that the evaluation of a certain decision might
result from both, the consistent application of procedures across people and time and the
decision outcome [11, 29, 30]. Following this argumentation, the decision-maker does
not necessarily determine the evaluation of a certain decision if the underlying decisionmaking process is clearly communicated and the decision outcome is comprehensible.
Building on this line of reasoning, the identical amount of information on the decisionmaking process should lead to equal transparency perceptions of a human’s vs. an
algorithm’s decision given that the rating individual receives identical information
on the decision-making underlying processes. In particular, the degree of perceived
decision transparency should be predominantly driven by transparently communicating
the underlying decision-making processes. Therefore, I hypothesize:
H1a : Individuals will voice higher levels of decision transparency when subjected to
decision-making processes with additional information.
In contrast, there are reasons to believe that decisions made by algorithms may
generate greater concerns than human decisions when no further information on the
decision-making process is provided. Recent scholarly research has shown that individuals expect algorithms to decide differently than human decision-makers. While human
decision-makers are associated with the ability to take individual circumstances into
account and weight decision outcomes with regard to moral rules [9], algorithms are
perceived to be reductionistic [26]. In addition, individuals assume algorithms to be more

likely to violate moral rules as they are usually generated to maximize a predefined objective [1]. As a result, the decision procedures of algorithms will be reduced to numerical
representations and lead to the assumption to be less accurate and barely comprehensible.
Therefore, without any additional information provided on the decision-making process,
individuals should rate human decisions as more comprehensible, such that I assume:
H1b : Individuals will voice lower levels of decision transparency for an algorithm’s
decision compared to the same decision made by a human when subjected to
decision-making processes with no additional information.
Directly related to transparency perceptions of decision-making processes are fairness
considerations associated with the decision. Especially individuals who are not directly
included in the decision-making process might have different perceptions regarding the
decision fairness depending on the agent who made the decision. For organizations,
these perceptions can be critical in determining their external perception by consumers
and other important stakeholders. Therefore, it is important to determine how human
and algorithmic decision agents differ in how fair and ethical they are perceived.
2.2

Fairness concerns regarding human-algorithm interactions

Fairness, in general decision situations, is defined as a social construct that attributes
subjective perceptions of equity, equality, needs, underlying procedures, and interpersonal treatment to objective aspects of a certain decision [11]. With the increasing use of
algorithms in human decision-making, fairness has also become a key determinant for
the development of algorithmic decision-making [31]. Indeed, algorithm fairness is listed
as a main requirement for the development of reliable artificial intelligence (AI) [12].
While prior research predominately focuses on approaches to advance algorithm fairness
from a technical perspective to generate unbiased decision outcomes [21, 22], there is a
relatively small body of literature that is concerned with individual’s subjective fairness
perceptions of human vs. algorithm decision-making (for a review see [13]). However,
as the use of algorithms has also societal implications for the humans that are exposed to
a particular decision outcome, it is crucial to investigate individual’s fairness perceptions
of algorithm decisions.
Recent research has recognized the importance of this demand and investigated
algorithm fairness perceptions in the field of human resources [2, 26, 32], criminal
justice [33], and resource allocation decisions [34]. In these studies, scholars provided
several evidence that individuals rate decisions made by humans significantly fairer
than those made by algorithms. The reason for this directive might be, for example, that
individuals attribute algorithms to be reductionistic and not able to consider individual
circumstances in a certain decision. As a result, individuals might assume that algorithms
consider less accurate information and are unfairer than humans [26]. In contrast, other
scholars have shown that a large majority of participants voice higher fairness levels
for algorithms when they are directly confronted with the question if a human or an
algorithm makes fairer decisions [35, 36]. The preference for algorithmic decision agents
could be the result of the expectation that algorithms - provided that they fulfill fairness
requirements from a technical perspective - can remove human bias in decision-making

processes and, thereby, increase the objectivity of the decision outcome [21, 22, 37].
As the elimination of bias is one of the key elements for fairness perceptions [11],
algorithmic decisions that are characterized by mathematical logic, might be perceived
as fairer compared to a decision made by a human. To conclude, individuals who
are affected by a human or an algorithmic decision agent might be exposed to both,
the concern of reductionistic algorithms and the awareness of unbiased algorithms
that suppress human biases by relying on objective mathematical rules. Based on this
reasoning, I assume that individuals will balance these two assumptions such that fairness
ratings of humans and algorithm should be similar.
In addition, I theorize that - similar to decision transparency - individuals’ fairness
perceptions are not necessarily related to the decision agent. In prior research, numerous
scholars found evidence that individual fairness perceptions result merely from the
allocation rules and the procedures applied, and the decision outcome [38]. Following
this reasoning, the individual’s rating of decision fairness should be predominately
determined by decision-related characteristics such as the decision processes and the
decision outcome and not by the decision agent. As favorable decision outcomes are
more likely to receive higher fairness ratings [26, 39], I hypothesize:
H2a : Additional information on the decision process and a positive decision outcome
positively influence the individuals’ fairness perceptions.
As additional information is expeected to have a positive effect on fairness perceptions and it was previously theorized that information positively influence individuals’
perceptions of decision transparency, I consequently assume that:
H2b : Decision transparency positively influence the individuals’ fairness perceptions.

3

Methodology

To empirically test the hypotheses, I employed a survey-based online experiment in
which participants evaluated the credit decision of a financial institute. The study was
preregistered and complied ethical requirements as approved by the publication ethics
commissioner of the university department.
3.1

Experimental design

Participants who passed the attention check read about the decision of a financial
institute whether or not a customer qualifies for a loan. Participants further learned
that the financial institute can either have an employee or an algorithm making this
credit decision. In the survey, participants completed two tasks, where they evaluated
the same credit decision of a human and algorithmic decision maker in randomized
order. Depending on the condition, participants received additional information on the
employee’s and the algorithm’s decision-making process [The employee/algorithm made
this decision by weighting objective criteria such as age, gender, and income and using
prior data of similar customers to calculate the creditworthiness.] and read about either a
positive [the customer qualifies for a loan] or a negative [the customer doesn’t qualify

for a loan] credit decision. Next, participant rated how transparent and fair the decision
of the employee and the algorithm is.
The experiment consisted of a two-factor between-subjects design. The two factors were whether the the decision-making process was transparently communicated
(Information; yes vs. no) and whether the credit decision’s outcome was positive or
negative (Outcome; positive vs. negative). The Outcome condition was included to measure the robustness of the effects and control whether outcome favorability changes the
perception of decision transparency as suggested by prior research [26]. This design
led to four experimental groups, namely "NEG_I" (negative x information), "POS_I"
(positive x information), "NEG_NOI" (negative x no information), "POS_NOI" (positive
x no information) to which the participants were randomly assigned by the survey tool.
In addition, a within-subject design was implemented to address the decision-maker
(Decision-maker; Algorithm vs. Employee) in a randomized order.
3.2

Measures and scales

To cover the participants’ decision transparency perceptions I adapted the transparency
scale by Zhou et al. [40]. In addition, I constructed a 6-items decision fairness scale
by adapting the organizational justice scale from Conlon [41]. All scales showed a
very good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α >= .92) and were answered on a 7-point
Likert-Scale reaching from 1 = "Strongly disagree" to 7 = "Strongly agree" (see Table 1).
Table 1. Measurement scales and items used in the experiment.
Construct

Items

(1)
(2)
Decision
(3)
transparency (4)
(5)

I could fully understand the way the [algorithm] [employee] determined the decision of whether the customer qualifies for a loan.
I have a clear idea about the way the [algorithm] [employee] determined the decision of whether the customer qualifies for a loan.
I have a clear understanding of the [algorithm’s] [employee’s] decision.
I am able to comprehend the [algorithm’s] [employee’s] decision very well.
The way the [algorithm] [employee] determined the decision of whether the customer qualifies for a loan is transparent to me.

Fairness

The way the [algorithm] [employee] determined that the customer [doesn’t qualify] [qualifies] for a loan seems fair.
The [algorithm’s] [employee’s] process for deciding that the customer [doesn’t qualify] [qualifies] for a loan was fair.
The decision that the customer [doesn’t qualify] [qualifies] for a loan was fair.
The outcome of the decision that the customer [doesn’t qualify] [qualifies] for a loan was fair.
The [algorithm] [employee] made this decision in an unbiased and neutral manner.
The [algorithm] [employee] treated the customer with dignity and respect in making this decision.

3.3

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Participants

I preregistered that I would recruit 400 participants from Prolific. After posting the study,
438 participants clicked on the study link, 38 participants failed the attention check
and were not allowed to begin the study, and 400 participants completed all depended
measures. Participants were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions at
the beginning of the experiment. Failed attention checks lead to slightly unbalanced
randomization, however, there were no significant differences across the experimental
conditions regarding demographic characteristics. All participants who completed the
survey received a financial compensation.

Table 2. Demographic summary of participants in experimental groups
Characteristics
n
Female
Sex Male
Other
Age mean

4
4.1

NEG_I
101
77 (76%)
23 (23%)
1 (1%)
32.5

POS_I
102
79 (77%)
23 (23%)
0
32.6

NEG_NOI
96
68 (71%)
28 (29%)
0
33.3

POS_NOI
101
68 (67%)
32 (32%)
1 (1%)
30.6

Results
Manipulation check

To measure whether the transparency manipulation successfully increased the perceived
decision transparency, I adapted the data use transparency scale by Martin et al. [42].
Participants evaluated the way the algorithm respectively the employee determined the
decision on a 7-point semantic differential using the items "Unclear to me - Clear to
me", "Confusing - Straightforward", "Difficult to understand - Easy to understand",
and "Vague - Transparent". Participants in the information conditions (M = 5.51, SD =
1.23) and in the non information conditions (M = 3.58, SD = 1.51) differed significantly
regarding their perception of process transparency (F(1,398) = 196.453, p < .001). This
result indicates that the transparency manipulation was successful.
4.2

Hypotheses testing

Decision transparency To test hypotheses H1a and H1b and compare the group means
with regard to the perceived decision transparency, I ran a two-way mixed ANOVA.
The model included the four experimental conditions as between-subject factors and
the transparency evaluation of the decision agent (algorithm vs. employee) as a withinsubject factor.
The two-way mixed ANOVA revealed significant main effects of the experimental
conditions, (F(3, 369) = 54.992, p < .01), and the decision agent, (F (1, 396) = 16.735,
p < .01) on the decision transparency expressed by the participants. In a subsequent
post-hoc analysis, pairwise comparison shows that the mean transparency score was
significantly different in conditions with additional information vs. no additional information on the decision-making process, thus supporting hypothesis H1a and H1b (see
Table 3).
Table 3. Post-hoc analysis of the group differences in the experimental conditions
Group1
NEG_I
NEG_I
POS_I
NEG_I
POS_I
NEG_NOI

Group 2
n
202
202
204
202
204
192

POS_I
NEG_NOI
NEG_NOI
POS_NOI
POS_NOI
POS_NOI

p (adj.)
n
204
192
192
202
202
202

n.s.
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
n.s.

The post-hoc analysis further revealed that the only significant difference in transparency perceptions between algorithmic and human decision makers was in the NEG_NOI
condition (F(1,190) = 4.102, p < .01) where participants experienced a negative credit
decision and didn’t receive further information on the decision-making process, suggesting that this significant main effect was mostly driven by this condition. This indicates
that in situations under uncertainty, individuals seems to rely more on human decision
agents. In contrast, in situations that are transparent and linked to a rather positive
decision outcome, individuals do not seem to have any preferences for either a human or
an algorithm. Figure 1 summarizes the participants’ decision transparency ratings per
condition.
7

Decision transparency

6

5

Decisionmaker
Algorithm

4

Employee
3

2

1
NEG_I

POS_I

NEG_NOI

POS_NOI

Conditions

Figure 1. Transparency perceptions of algorithmic and human decision-maker per experimental
group.

Fairness To determine whether the four experimental groups differed regarding the
fairness perceptions and and to test hypotheses H2a and H2b , I lastly calculated a twoway mixed ANOVA containing the four experimental conditions as between-subject
factors and the fairness perceptions of the decision-maker (algorithm vs. employee) as a
within-subject factor .
The two-way mixed ANOVA revealed significant differences between the group
means of the conditions with regard to the fairness perceptions (F(3, 396) = 21.998, p
< .01). However, even though the descriptive statistics shows slightly higher fairness
levels for the human decision agent (see Figure 2) the ratings for the algorithm and the
employee were, in general, the same (F(1, 396) = 2.555, p = .134). In the post-hoc
pairwise comparison, the Bonferroni adjusted p-value shows that the mean fairness score
was significantly different in the conditions NEG_I vs. POS_I (p < .001), POS_I vs.
NEG_NOI (p < .001), POS_I vs. POS_NOI (p < .001). These results indicate that
the participants’ rating whether they perceive the decision to be fair is rather driven by
the decision outcome and additional information on the decision process then by the
decision-maker.

7

6

Fairness

5

Decisionmaker
Algorithm

4

Employee
3

2

1
NEG_I

POS_I

NEG_NOI

POS_NOI

Conditions

Figure 2. Fairness perceptions of algorithmic and human decision-maker per experimental group.

To shed further light on these findings, I ran a linear regression model. The model
included the following independent variables as predictors of the fairness perceptions:
Information (dummy: 1 if participant received additional information on the decision
process), Outcome (dummy: 1 if participant was in a positive outcome group), Decision
transparency, and the interaction term of Information*Outcome.
The regression model (see Table 4) for the participants’ fairness perceptions revealed
a significant positive main effect of Decision transparency, suggesting that participants
who perceive a higher degree of decision transparency experience the decision to be
more fair. This result is in line with H2b . Interestingly, the model further revealed a
significant negative main effect of additional information and no significant main effect
of the outcome variable. However, the significant positive interaction effect between
Information and Outcome suggests that fairness perceptions are complex and determined
by the interplay of decision-related factors, rather then by the decision-maker. In particular, the interaction effect suggests that fairness perceptions are higher for decisions
that are accompanied by the transparent communication of decision processes and with
a positive decision outcome. This result is in line with H2a .
Table 4. Regression results.
B
Constant
Decision transparency
Information
Outcome
Information*Outcome

2.516
0.461
-0.454
0.079
0.511

Std. Error
0.128
0.031
0.118
0.107
0.150

β

t

0.671
-0.225
0.039
0.221

19.575
15.024
-3.853
0.736
3.409

p
<.001 ***
<.001 ***
<.001 ***
0.462
<.001 ***

*, **, *** indicate significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% level

5

Discussion

The ubiquitous opportunity for humans to use algorithms in their decision-making
processes offers them the chance to autonomously analyze large data sets and derive

valuable insights in various decision domains. Despite this promising potential, the
ambiguous findings regarding the perceptions of algorithmic decision-making that might
hinder its acceptance among individuals illustrate the need for further research [2, 26, 35,
36]. I argue, that the differing findings in prior literature might rather be grounded in
decision-related factors than in the human or algorithmic nature of the respective decision
agent. The present study, therefore, extends prior research by challenging the overall
notion that differences in the perceptions of decision transparency and fairness result
solely from the distinct evaluations of human and algorithmic decision agents [6, 9]. As
prior studies predominantly concentrated on the decision-makers that apply algorithms
in their own decision-making processes, this work focuses on individuals that are not
actively involved in the decision-making process to shed further on individuals’ adoption
of algorithms.
Following this directive, I conducted a preregistered survey-based online experiment
in which a sample of 400 participants was asked to rate credit decisions of a financial
institute. In line with the hypotheses, I found that participants expressed - regardless
of the decision agent - a higher degree of decision transparency when they received
additional information on the decision outcome’s underlying processes. When participants were facing a negative decision outcome and received no additional information
on the decision processes, however, I found that decision transparency perceptions of
human and algorithmic decision agents differ significantly. The findings further indicate
that decision-related factors such as the transparent communication of the underlying
processes and the decision outcome significantly shape individual’s subjective fairness
perceptions - regardless of whether the decision was made by a human or an algorithm.
In addition, I showed that perceptions of decision transparency determine the individual’s
fairness ratings.
These results contribute to ongoing IS research in multiple ways. First, prior studies
on the effects of algorithmic decision-making provided inconclusive results with regard
to the preference for human and algorithmic decision-agents. The present paper, offers
an alternative explanatory approach by highlighting the importance of the individual’s
ability to making sense of a decision’s outcome. I further suggest that decision-related
factors, namely decision transparency and decision outcome are key determinants of
decision evaluation, thus illustrating that the evaluation of a decision does not solely
depend on the decision agent.
Second, I developed and tested the hypotheses drawing from prior findings on
decision-making processes that were not necessarily related to algorithms (e.g., [11]).
Thereby, I show that findings of prior research on behavioral IS are adaptable to the
context of algorithm decision-making. Thus, the results can serve as a starting point
to encourage scholars to rely on existing and well-established theories to explain new
phenomenons such as the perceptions of human and algorithmic decision agents and
their decisions.
Third, prior literature on algorithm fairness predominantly focuses on the technical
perspective of algorithmic decision-making and examines approaches to develop unbiased and fair algorithms [13, 43]. While these attempts are of particular importance
for the design of sustainable human-algorithm interactions, research on the individuals’
subjective fairness perceptions is limited [13]. By investigating fairness perceptions in

the experiment, I extend prior research and give guidance how providers of algorithmic
decision-making should communicate the underlying processes to increase fairness ratings. In addition, I show that fairness perceptions are mostly driven by decision-related
factors and are not necessarily resulting from the fact that a human or an algorithm made
a certain decision. This finding highlights the need for future research that investigates
not only perceptions of human and algorithms, but also factors that are associated with
human and algorithmic decision-making and might affect the evaluation of a certain
decision outcome.
Next to these theoretical contributions, this paper provides implications for managers
and practitioners. The findings on the importance of transparency and decision outcomes
in human and algorithmic decision-making give organizations guidance of how decision processes should be communicated and how they can avoid reluctant behavior in
situations with negative decision outcomes. Lastly, with the transparent communication
of decision processes, the present study identifies an easily implementable intervention to shape individuals’ perceptions of algorithmic decision making, illustrating that
encouraging individuals to rely on algorithms is neither costly nor complex.
5.1

Limitations and future research

Although this research provides valuable results, I want to point out potential limitations
of the present study. First, participants in the study evaluated a hypothetical credit
decision that does not have real consequences for their own finances. This limitation,
however, gives scholars guidance regarding the individuals’ baseline perceptions towards
human and algorithmic decision agents and shows that individuals do not reject algorithm
decision-making per se. This baseline, thus, suggests that implementing organizations
have many possibilities to shape the individuals’ perceptions of algorithms. Second, the
present study was conducted with participants from the UK with a sample size of 400.
Participants from other countries and with a differing cultural background might express
contrasting decision transparency and fairness perceptions.
5.2

Conclusion

The present study aimed at identifying whether decision transparency and fairness
perceptions differ when individuals are confronted with human or algorithmic decisionmaking. With respect to the research questions, I found evidence that individuals prefer
human over algorithms when they are confronted with a undesirable decision outcome
and are not aware of the processes that were applied to derive a certain decision outcome.
However, individuals show no significant preference for either a human or an algorithm
when they receive additional information on the underlying decision-making processes.
In line with these findings, I found that fairness perceptions are not necessarily related
to the decision agent. Instead, I showed that fairness perceptions are mostly affected
by decision-related factors (i.e., information and outcome) and decision transparency.
To conclude, the findings give guidance on how to communicate algorithmic decisionmaking and suggest that decision-related factors should also be taken into account when
relying on human or algorithmic decision agents.
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